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Abstract: For theorists of political liberalism, individual rights take priority 
over  the  good.  Communitarians  hold,  however,  that  a  society  focused 
exclusively on  individual rights  will  be  made  up  of  atomistic  selves  who 
cannot sustain any commitment to the common good. Aristotle’s discussions 
of  friendship  and  the  common  good  can  contribute  to  the  conversation 
concerning the polis and its ends. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics emphasizes 
homonoia, but his Politics envisions “political friendship” more as a space 
for  agonistic  struggle.  Aristotle  knows  about  the  destructive  effects  of 
pleonexia,  and  he  describes  several  community-building  virtues  that  are 
opposed to it: justice, temperance, and liberality. Aristotle also claims that the 
genre of tragedy can inform a commitment to work for the common good.  
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ARISTOTLE’S CLAIM ABOUT THE “NATURALNESS” OF THE 
POLIS  
Aristotle claims that the polis emerges in a very natural way. Implied 
in this claim is that the polis has a nature (φύσις), a function (έργον), 
and an end (τέλος). He offers a teleological sketch of its development 
in Politics 1252-1253.
1 At the most basic level, a man and a woman 
are drawn together by nature to form a household, and it is natural for 
them to care in turn for their children, who also have a stake in the 
future of the household. House, wife, and ox -- all three are needed for 
family life, says Hesiod.  
Families need food, shelter, and protection from hostile attack, 
and seeing that the household has difficulty meeting these needs on its 
own, what could be more natural than several households banding 
together to form a village? A number of villages come together to form 
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a  polis  for  the  practical  purposes  associated  with  self-sufficiency 
(ʱὐτάρκειʱ), but more especially, for the sake of higher values such as 
justice and the noble deeds that they can do for each other (Politics 
1280b7-1281a4).
2 As Homer says in The Iliad, to be tribeless, lawless, 
hearthless – that would not be a properly human life (1253a4).  
So,  Aristotle  provides  us  with  a  picture  of  a  polis  growing 
toward an end, but where is that growth to stop? Recalling that oak 
trees typically do not grow much higher than a hundred feet, we can 
ask: Does the polis also have an optimum size, one based on its τέλος? 
Rather than answer this question with a fixed number of people or a set 
number of acres, Aristotle offers criteria by which the health of a city 
can be judged. There is a lower limit of size that must be reached: the 
city must have enough people to defend itself, and an adequate number 
of productive workers to be self-sufficient.  
There is also an upper limit beyond which a city should not 
grow in size. If there are too many people, the city will be unable to 
educate  its  citizens  in  virtue,  and  that  failure  will  have  serious 
consequences  (1280b10-12;  NE  1179b).  In  a  city  that  is  too  large, 
anonymity also becomes a liability. When seeking to fill public offices 
on the basis of merit, citizen-voters need to know something about 
those for whom they are voting. When weighing questions of justice in 
the courts, citizen-jurors need to be acquainted with the character of 
those  involved  in  the  case.  Without  that  background  of  personal 
familiarity, courts will fail to reach just decisions, and in elections, the 
better candidate will not win out over the worse (1326b13-19). So, 
there is something of a natural limit for a city, and if it should grow to 
become  an  empire  instead,  its  functions  (έργοι)  -  agriculture/food, 
defense/safety, education in virtue, the diffusion of technology, and the 
administration of justice –become overextended and tend to deteriorate 
(1328b5-22).
3  
Aristotle’s  account  of  what  is  “natural”  in  politics  is  very 
different from that of Thucydides. In The History of the Peloponnesian 
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War, what is “natural” is for men to be motivated by fear.
4 When we 
read about The Plague in  Athens, The Civil Strife in  Corcyra, The 
Melian Dialogue, and the debacle of The Sicilian Expedition, we find 
them  either  already  in  the  grip  of  fear,  or  failing  to  anticipate  the 
danger  that  is  lurking  just  over  the  horizon.  In  Aristotle,  however, 
social  trust  may  not  have  not  abolished  fear  altogether,  but  it  has 
certainly displaced it, moving fear away from center stage. What is 
“natural” in Aristotle’s vision of politics has more to do with families 
taking care of their children, the moral significance of friendship, and 
the role of the virtues in shaping the life of the polis.
5  
In at least one way, however, we might wish that Aristotle had 
said much,  much  less.  Aristotle’s  sketch  of  the  city’s  “naturalness” 
assumes  that  some  people  are  naturally  slaves,  while  others  are 
naturally masters. He says that women, too, are by nature unfit to be 
active  participants in  the  deliberations of the city.  Others are  to  be 
excluded,  as  well:  farm  workers,  craftsmen,  shopkeepers  and 
foreigners. By Aristotle’s account, then, a “natural” household (οἶκος) 
is built on the belief that some people can be owned as tools, used in 
an  instrumental  way,  and  subjected  to  various  forms  of  exclusion 
without  any  of  that  counting  as  an  injustice.
6 However, if all these 
people are to be excluded from political participation, how then can we 
be speaking of a common good?  
We might also ask: If the city truly is natural through and 
through, why is there any need at all for political action or debate? 
Aristotle praises the one who first founded the city. Whoever that 
person was, he was a great benefactor (1253a30 -31). The lawgiver, 
too,  is said to be a craftsman who forms the city by means of a 
constitution (1273b32-33). However, it is not altogether clear why a 
natural city that grows organically would have need of “benefactors” 
or “craftsmen.”
7 If the city is natural the way a garden is, it might need 
nothing more than a guard to keep predators out at night, which is to 
say, it might run best if we just left it alone.  
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Could it be, though, that Aristotle understands the city to be 
natural in its origin, but shaped by the art of politics in some other 
way, say, in the ends it chooses to pursue? This formulation -“the ends 
it chooses to pursue” – calls for further examination. Aristotle uses an 
example  from  horsemanship  to  shed  light  on  the  broader  question 
concerning means and ends. The bridle-maker practices his craft, for 
whom? For the sake of the rider. The rider uses it to guide his horse. 
Why? Because he is part of a cavalry that seeks to defend the polis. 
The soldier rides into battle under the leadership of a general. Above 
the general in this hierarchy is a statesman or a king, one who guides 
the polis in matters of war and peace. So the bridle-maker and all the 
others we have mentioned contribute to a higher end: the deliberations 
concerning  the  welfare  of  the  polis,  in  which  the  military  option 
represents one choice among others to be considered by statesmen (NE 
1094a1).
8  
Can we carry this reflection a step further and ask about the 
ultimate end of the  polis?  According  to  Aristotle,  an  ultimate  end 
would be (a) an end desired for itself, (b) an end not desired for the 
sake of any other end that might be proposed, and (c) everything else 
that is desired, is desired for the sake of this one end (NE, 1094a18-22; 
1097a30-b6).
9 Is there a single good that fulfills and satisfies all these  
lesser ends? In Book X, chapters 6-8 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
himself  concludes  -  somewhat  abruptly  -  that  it  is  θεωρίʱ,  or 
contemplation.  But  how  convincing  is  his  proposal?  Why  settle  on 
contemplation as the ultimate end for life in the polis? To take just one 
alternative, one  considered by Aristotle himself, a  more compelling 
case might be made for a life in which contemplation and action are 
combined (1325b15-17).  
Another kind of interpretation argues for “inclusivism”, or the 
view that the final good is a composite that includes not just the one 
good called “contemplation”, but many other virtues that the moral 
agent puts into action.
10 One of the strongest considerations in favor of 
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the  inclusive  interpretation  is  that  the  virtues  are  often  said  to  be 
unified  and  interconnected  (“the  inseparability  thesis”),  so  much  so 
that the appearance of just one by itself is somewhat suspect.  
A different kind of critique, though, one even more radical than 
the inclusivism of Hardie and Ackrill, is what we might call a “real life 
objection.” It runs something like this. If a homogeneous community 
exists, one final good might make complete sense to the members of 
that polis. Hardie and Ackrill imagine instead a composite good as the 
end  that  guides  a  more  pluralistic  but  still  basically  harmonious 
community.  However,  the  real-life  communities  of  our  experience 
have  within  them  many  smaller  associations  –  religious,  civic, 
professional groups and all manner of special interest enclaves. Each 
of these smaller associations enjoys its own vision of the good, often 
with  very  little  thought  about  other  groups,  sometimes  with  open 
hostility toward others. In any case, a common good is not on their 
agenda, and they are not at all likely to agree on the nature of one final 
end for the polis. As a consequence, the bridle/ horse/cavalry/general/ 
statesman  model  that  at  first  looked  so  promising  for  describing  a 
target at which “archers of the common good” might aim, now begins 
to  look  much  more  problematic  (NE  1094a23-24).  At  least  for  the 
moment, then, we might be inclined to suspend this line of inquiry, and 
turn to other resources in Aristotle that might help us think about the 
nature of the common good.  
 
THE  COMMON  GOOD  AND  THREE  VIRTUES:  JUSTICE, 
TEMPERANCE, LIBERALITY  
Justice  is  one  of  the  fundamental  values  that  brings  households 
together to form the polis. It will help the next part of our inquiry if we 
can begin with a more formal definition of justice (δικʱιοσύνη), and 
there is a sturdy one found in Plato’s Republic. “Justice is giving to 
every person that which is due him.”  We find four dimensions of 
justice in Aristotle’s political thinking: (1) compensatory justice, (2) 
contractual justice, (3) retributive/punitive justice, and (4) distributive 
justice. A few words are in order, now, about how each of them helps 
us think about “what is due” to others.  
In  Book  V  of  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Aristotle  describes 
situations in which a judge must decide whether someone has been 
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from a victim, the offender can be ordered to make just compensation 
for that loss.
11  
Contractual justice is based on a formal voluntary promise that 
obligates two parties in a relationship. For example: you promise to do 
some work on my house, and in return, I promise to pay you a certain 
amount of money for that work. If one of us fails to keep his promise, 
then the courts may order that the original terms of the contract be 
enforced (1321b13-18; Rhetoric 1376b1-20).
12  
A third type,  retributive/punitive  justice,  has  to  do  with  the 
laws of the community and the way those laws discourage us from 
acting on our evil desires and impulses (1321b41-1322a18). So long as 
we remain under law, we may become the best of creatures, but apart 
from  law,  we  become  the  worst  of  creatures,  savage,  violent,  and 
unholy (1253a32-37). This form of justice may be the most coercive, 
but even so, one of the maxims of punitive justice says that penalties 
should seek a “mean.” They should not be too lenient, nor too harsh. 
The punishment should fit the crime.  
Coming  then  to  distributive  justice  --  distributive  justice  is 
concerned  with  the  proper  sharing  of  the  common  good  among 
citizens, understood as “honor, money, or any of the good things of 
which there is a part for those who share in the regime” (NE 1130b30). 
This kind of sharing is likely to involve sacrifice on the part of some 
citizens, while benefits are bestowed on some others. Citizens have a 
deep-rooted sense of what is “due” to them, however, and they find it 
hard to accept a smaller share than what they have been expecting. If 
we  imagine  Achilles  brooding  in  his  tent,  angry  and  resentful  that 
Agamemnon has taken Briseis from him, then we shall be close to 
understanding  that  feeling  of  being  denied  something  that  one  is 
“supposed to have.”  
  Temperance,  or  self-control,  is  the  virtue  that  helps  human 
beings set limits to their own desires. Temperance can help us accept 
with equanimity those sacrifices we are called upon to make for the 
sake  of  the  common  good.  If  the  members  of  the  polis  have  not 
developed  the  virtue  of  temperance,  however,  their  pursuit  of  self-
interest (πλεονεξιʱ) can undermine the common good. Apt definitions 
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of pleonexia include: covetousness, avarice, and “the desire to have 
more than others, to have more than one’s share, to have everything.”
13  
  To be sure, Aristotle does say that there is a properly moderate 
way to provide for the needs of one’s household, and for this purpose 
he  endorses  such  activities  as  shepherding,  farming,  hunting,  and 
fishing (1256a19-1256b26). In addition, he says that temperance by 
itself does not lead to happiness. Temperance and liberality are both 
needed for the good life. Liberality is the virtue of being generous, 
bestowing gifts on those we choose to give to, and for that we need 
something more than the bare necessities of life (1265a30-38).  
  Accumulating more than one’s share, however, is inimical to 
the requirements of distributive justice.
14 A “gallery of rogues” from 
ancient  Athens  remembered  for  their  pleonexia  might  include 
Callicles,  Thrasymachus,  and  Alcibiades.  In  the  Gorgias,  Callicles 
does  not  want  to  accept  any  limit  on  his  pursuit  of  pleasure. 
Thrasymachus tries to defend the claim that “might makes right” in 
Book I of The Republic. In The History of the Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides makes it plain that Alcibiades cares little for peace and the 
reign of virtue in his own polis –his attention is turned to enslaving and 
profiting from other cities.
15  
Aristotle’s  good  citizen,  however,  balances  his  self-interests 
and  his  commitment  to  the  common  good,  so  that  neither  one  is 
eclipsed.  Aristotle  describes  a  threefold  division  of  civic 
responsibilities in Athens based on age (1329a1-35). (1) Young men, 
those who are physically strong, serve as hoplite warriors and defend 
the  city.  (2)  Middle-aged  men,  those  who  have  lived  longer  and 
developed greater depths of moral virtue, are the ones best suited to 
political leadership and public debate. (3) The elderly help the city by 
serving as priests and honoring the gods. Aristotle also uses a nautical 
analogy to suggest how those who have various responsibilities might 
work together toward a common good. Sailors on a ship have different 
duties – some serve as pilots, some as rowers, others are designated for 
look-out duty. Yet each contributes to a more comprehensive good: the 
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overall  success  of  the  ship’s  voyage,  or  “the  salvation  of  the 
community”(1276b25-30).  
 
CIVIC  FRIENDSHIP  AND  POLITICAL  DISCOURSE: 
DELIBERATIVE OR AGONISTIC?  
Moreover, friendship would seem to hold cities together, and 
legislators  would  seem  to  be  more  concerned  about  it  than 
about justice. For concord (ὁμόνοιʱ) would seem to be similar 
to friendship, and they aim at concord among all, while they 
tryabove all to expel stasis, which is enmity. (NE 1155a22-26)  
Human flourishing (εὐδʱιμονίʱ) is built on mutual commitments to a 
shared  life.  Aristotle  envisions  life  in  the  polis  as  something  that 
requires  κοινωνίʱ  –  fellowship,  or  partnership.  We  are  the  sort  of 
creatures who must live together in cities, if we are to live well. A 
beast or a god may find fulfillment in isolation, but for human beings, 
a  good life is  one  shared  between a  person,  his  family, a  circle  of 
friends, and his fellow citizens (NE 1097b).  
Some of these ties will be intense, while others will not be as 
strong. There are different kinds of friendships, depending on whether 
they are based on (1) pleasurable activities, (2) advantage/usefulness, 
or (3) virtue/good character (NE 1156).
16 Friendships based on good 
character  involve  care and  regard for  another person’s  projects  and 
desires (NE 1166a1-b26). If I am a friend to someone, I hope these 
good things will come to pass, not for my own sake, but primarily for 
his.  I  am  inclined,  insofar  as  I  am  able,  to  help  bring  these  things 
about. Reciprocity is an important dimension of friendship: “A friend 
is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return (Rhetoric 
1380b-1381a).”  Time  is  another  important  element  in  friendship. 
Friends simply enjoy spending time in each other’s company, sharing 
in each other’s joys and sorrows.  
  Friendships based on pleasurable activities, or on “being useful 
to each other,” are also valuable, but they are not as meaningful as 
character-based friendships. What do these friendships lack? Since our 
feelings about which activities we enjoy are always subject to change, 
it follows that we are likely to leave those friends behind, or be left 
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behind by them, when the next “season” comes around (NE 1157a14-
16). Business, too, has its own uncertainties and anxieties because of 
greed and competition, which tend to undercut the trust needed for 
friendship.
17 We do indeed  require a measure of worldly goods for  
εὐδʱιμονίʱ, but friendships based on virtue are about something other 
than building a commercial empire or acquiring wealth (1256b13-15; 
1323b7-9).  
  There is, as well, another very important kind of friendship, 
civic or political friendship. To be engaged in civic friendship means 
that we show an abiding concern for various forms of relationship in 
the polis – the quality of marriages and family life, the liveliness of 
fraternal  associations,  enthusiasm  for  religious  festivals,  and  other 
community  activities  (1280b34-43).  These  are  all  elements  of  the 
common good. If we tried to imagine a polis in which none of these 
good things were possible, the question would be: who would choose 
to live there? On the other hand, an “abiding concern” for these goods 
is  not  always  experienced  at  the  level  of  intimacy.  More  typically, 
civic friendship involves appreciating these forms of interaction from a 
respectful distance.  
  Moreover, there is another side to civic or political friendship 
that is more agonistic. We have a common life together, not the way a 
herd of cattle does – by simply grazing in the same pasture; not the 
way a colony of bees does, by working for the hive and defending it 
instinctively - but by sharing in argument and thought (NE 1170b11-
12).
18 Men are endowed by nature with the power to speak, and that is 
what makes it possible for them to deliberate about what is just and 
unjust (1253a7-18). In the  agon of the city’s political life there will 
always be questions about the ranking of goods, along with arguments 
in which one side is trying to persuade others to change their minds 
about the order in which those goods should be ranked.
19  
  This brings us to an important question, then, about the nature 
of political deliberation. Does Aristotle take political friendship to be 
primarily a matter of  homonoia (“being of one mind”) and therefore 
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closer  to  being  a  form  of  virtue-based  friendship?
20 Or, given its 
conflictual nature, is political deliberation better understood  under the 
aegis of friendships that are not so intimate, in which citizens deal with 
each other on the basis of what is mutually advantageous to them?  
  Those  who  seek  a  strong  connection  between  political 
deliberation and virtue friendship point out that the formal unity of the 
polis may be supplied by the procedures embodied in its constitution, 
but its continued survival depends upon the growth of fraternal bonds 
between  its  citizens.
21 The  best  safeguard  against  the  violence  of 
political revolution is solidarity, a stable spirit of friendship among the 
members of the  polis (1262b7-9). According to Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Aristotle regards political conflict as an evil that can be eliminated. 
“The virtues are all in harmony with each other and the harmony of 
individual character is reproduced in the harmony of the state.”
22 By 
Schwarzenbach’s account, too, Aristotle believes the legislator should 
aim at making the polis feel more like a family than a commercial 
enterprise.
23  
  According  to  the  agonistic  model  of  political  discussion, 
however, when we meet for deliberation in the public square, we are 
not brothers, nor are we comrades.
24 Aristotle is wary of proposals that 
have  “a  specious  appearance  of  benevolence;  men  readily  listen  to 
them and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner 
everybody will become everybody’s friend (1263b15-17).” Feelings of 
“fraternity” must not be allowed to substitute for justice. That would 
be a convenient way of avoiding the hard decisions that need to be 
made  concerning  the  just  distribution  of  goods  and  sacrifices.  “We 
need not feel a strong commitment to our partners in deliberation, but 
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rather a less demanding commitment to the process of public problem-
solving -that is, to politics. Attention need not be kindly, then; it can be 
strategic or grudging.”
25 What we need are the practices of rhetoric 
and  listening  to  the  other.  If  we  have  these,  prior  bonds  of  virtue-
friendship are not necessary. We can still have a fruitful debate about 
what is just and what contributes to the common good. If we look at 
the typical models for discourse cited by those who prefer “strong ties” 
in  political  deliberation  -families,  intimate  friends,  and  religious 
communities – we should notes that their disagreements, when they do 
come,  can  be  so  divisive  as  to  invite  disaster  on  a  community 
(1328a16).  
   Still,  we  can  hope  -  may  it  not  be  in  vain  -  that  agonistic 
discussion  will  yield  an  enriched  understanding  of  “the  other”  that 
brings  us  closer  to  justice,  rather  than  simply  reiterating  and 
perpetuating deep-rooted bitterness. Without a forum for such dialogue 
and argument, how else are strangers and enemies - and here we ought 
not  to  exclude  ourselves  from  this  openness  to  change  -  to  be 
transformed into friends?  
 
THE GOOD MAN AND SOCIAL CHANGE: WHY TALK ABOUT 
TRAGEDY?  
As to whether the virtue by which a man is good (agathos) and  
a citizen upright (spoudaios) is to be regarded as different or      
the same... in the ideal city the upright citizen is the same as the 
good man, whereas in another sort of city, he is different from 
the good man.  (Politics 1278b)  
It would be good, now, to look more closely at the specific nature of 
the citizen’s obligation to the polis. Citizens are pledged to protect the 
constitution of their city (1320a15-16; 1276b28-31). They are also said 
to  “have  a  share  in  the  constitution,”  meaning  a  share  in  whatever 
honors  the  city  can  bestow  on  all  its  citizens,  but  also  a  shared 
responsibility to participate in the deliberative and judicial offices of 
the  city  (1290a30-37,  1292a2-3).  In  light  of  political  pluralism, 
however, the moral practices required under one constitution will not 
be identical to those called for under the constitution of another polis, 
and this diversity leads Aristotle to examine the difference between a 
                                                            
25 Susan Bickford (1996), “Beyond Friendship: Aristotle on Conflict, Deliberation, 
and  Attention,”  The  Journal  of  Politics  58.2:  398-421.  James  Wilson  (2011), 
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good citizen and a good man. A citizen is deemed courageous in light 
of some law (νομος) known to the city. A good man, however, discerns 
what is courageous by the light of reason (λογος). Just as fire burns the 
same way in Persia as in Athens, natural justice is unwritten and is the 
same everywhere, and that is what guides a good man (NE, 1134b18-
1135a5).  
  We can anticipate, then, that there will be conflicts between 
man-made  law  and  the  higher,  unwritten  law.  Aristotle  sees  in 
Sophocles” Antigone a paradigmatic example of this conflict (Rhetoric 
1373b1-14).
26 In the wake of an attempted coup, Creon, King of 
Thebes,  has  decreed  that  no  traitor  will  receive  a  proper  burial. 
Antigone believes that an older, deeper law compels her to bury her 
brother, Polyneices, no matter what other law he has violated.  
CREON  
And yet you dared to break those very laws?  
ANTIGONE  
Yes. Zeus did not announce those laws...  
And Justice living with the gods below 
sent no such laws for men.  
I did not think anything which you proclaimed strong enough 
to  let  a  mortal  override  the  gods  and  their  unwr itten  and 
unchanging laws. They’re not just for today or yesterday, but 
exist forever, and no one knows where they first appeared...  
An  upright  citizen  obeys  the  laws  of  the  polis.
27A good person is 
guided by moral virtue.  These two sources of obligation may often 
overlap, but they will not always be identical.
28    
  This distinction, between an upright citizen who obeys the laws 
of the city and the good man who is guided by an unwritten law, raises 
the  question  of  working  for  political  change.  For  the  most  part, 
Aristotle is not enthusiastic about attempts to reform the laws of the 
polis. “For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil... the citizen 
will not gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the 
habit  of  disobedience...For  the  law  has  no  power  to  command 
                                                            
26 Gabriela Ramow  (2008),  “Aristotle,  Antigone,  and  Natural Justice,” History of 
Political Thought 29.4: 585-600.  
27 Peter  Simpson  (1990),  “Making  the  Citizens  Good:  Aristotle’s  City  and  Its 
Contemporary Relevance,” The Philosophical Forum 22.2: 149-166.  
28 David Keyt (2007),“The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle’s Ethics 
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obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so 
that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of 
the law (1269a12-25).”  
  Aristotle  does  know  of  a  few  people,  however,  who  have 
burned with zeal for justice, leaders whose anger led them to strike a 
blow  against  an  unjust  order  (1310b1-1313a16).  To  be  sure,  the 
connection between rhetoric and justice can be unstable.  Democracies 
can be stirred up and led to unjust actions by demagogues, and the evil 
desires of tyrants often find confirmation in flattery (1292a2-30). In 
Rhetoric 2.8, however, Aristotle says that the emotion of pity can lead 
us to merciful deeds, because it is “a feeling of pain caused by the sight 
of  some  evil,  deadly  or  painful,  which  befalls  one  who  does  not 
deserve it, and  which  we  might expect  to  befall  ourselves  or  some 
friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon (Rhetoric 1385b).”  
  The  genre  of  tragedy  is  especially  relevant  to  Aristotle’s 
discussion of pity and compassion.
29 When we are confronted with the 
suffering of a character in drama – Antigone, Oedipus, Iphigenia – we 
are better able to recognize our kinship with real human beings who 
suffer. And if we can make that leap from recognizing tragedy on the 
stage to recognizing the presence of suffering in the polis, will we not 
be less likely to seek political domination over others, and more likely 
to seek justice with them and for them?
30  
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